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MCKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
Nichole Medical Equipment and Supply Company (“Nichole 
Medical”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of an action that Nichole 
Medical brought to recover damages for various state and federal claims.   
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction  
and because Nichole Medical had not stated a claim for which relief could 
be granted.  For reasons that follow, we agree. We also agree that all of 
Nichole Medical’s claims arise under the Medicare Act and that the 
Defendants/Appellees are therefore immune from suit as officers or 
employees of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services.  Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 
complaint.  
I. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
 
This suit originates from relationships that were created under the 
Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq., (“Act”).  The Act is administered 
through private organizations that contract with the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services.*  30 FED. PROC. §71:746.  
Pursuant to statutory provisions in effect prior to October 1, 2005, 
Medicare Part B was administered by organizations known as “carriers.”†
 
 
Id.  Carriers entered into contracts with the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”).  The obligations undertaken by carriers under 
those contracts include paying for items Medicare suppliers provide to 
Medicare beneficiaries, adjusting any incorrect payments, and recovering 
overpayments when the carrier concludes an overpayment was made for a 
covered Medicare benefit. 42 C.F.R. §§ 421.100, 421.200; see also 30 Fed. 
Proc. §§ 71:747, 71:754. 
                                                 
* The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), through the Secretary, 
exercises its authority to administer Medicare through the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.  Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 
268, 275 (2006). 
† Medicare Part B (Medical Insurance) covers ambulance, physician, laboratory, durable 
medical supplies and other non-institutional services.  3 Health L. Prac. Guide §45:24 
(2011).   
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As a result of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, the obligations previously imposed on carriers 
are now undertaken by Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACS”). 
See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,§911(e), 117 Stat. 2066, 2256 (2003).‡
 
  MACS 
enter into contracts with CMS to perform various duties pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. §1395kk-1.  42 U.S.C. §1395kk-1; see also 42 C.F.R. §421.401.  
Those duties include assisting in the administration of the Medicare 
Integrity Program.  42 U.S.C. §1395kk-1; see also, 30 Fed. Proc. §71:746.   
Pursuant to the Medicare Integrity Program, entities known as 
“Program Safeguard Contractors” (“PSCs”) contract with CMS to perform 
various program integrity tasks to “safeguard” Medicare payments on 
behalf of the Secretary.  See 42 U.S.C. §1395ddd(a).  PSCs responsibilities 
include reviewing Medicare payments for potential fraud and ensuring that 
amounts billed under the Medicare program are appropriate and supported 
by proper documentation.  See 42 U.S.C. §1395ddd(b).   
 
This auditing obligation thus requires MACs and PCSs to determine 
if amounts paid under Medicare “are reasonable and necessary in 
accordance with Medicare coverage policies and program instructions.”  42 
C.F.R. §421.500.  In discharging this obligation, CMS or a Medicare 
contractor can suspend payments under the Act in whole or in part “if CMS 
or the Medicare contractor possesses reliable information that an 
overpayment existed or that the payments to be made may not be correct, 
although additional information may be needed for a determination.”§
 
 42 
C.F.R. §405.371(a)(1) (emphasis added). A Medicare contractor is also 
authorized to offset or recoup Medicare payments, in whole or in part, if it 
is “determined that the provider or supplier to whom payments are to be 
made has been overpaid.”  42 C.F.R. §405.371(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
                                                 
‡ The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
amended the guidelines under which Medicare claims were processed and, in doing so, 
changed the terms identifying administering organizations.  See Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, sec. 911(e), 
117 Stat. 2066, 2256 (2003); see also MacKenzie Medical Supply, Inc. v. Leavitt, 506 
F.3d 341, 344 n.1 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to §911 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, . . . with an effective date of October 1, 
2005, most of the carrier responsibilities have been transferred to entities now labeled 
medicare administrative contractors.”).   
§ A Medicare contractor includes, but is not limited to, a carrier, a MAC and/or a PSC.  
42 C.F.R. §405.370. 
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At all times relevant to our inquiry, Nichole Medical was a durable 
medical equipment supplier,** National Heritage Insurance Company 
(“NHIC”) was a carrier and/or a MAC††
 
 and TriCenturion was a PSC. See 
42 U.S.C. §1395u. 
II. Factual Background 
 
This dispute arises from an audit TriCenturion conducted of Nichole 
Medical’s in the course of TriCenturion discharging its obligations under 
the Act as a PSC. After examining records obtained from Nichole 
Medical’s office, TriCenturion concluded that Nichole Medical “might” be 
improperly billing Medicare for medical equipment such as the motorized 
wheelchairs and hospital beds that Nichole Medical provided to Medicare 
beneficiaries. TriCenturion’s examination of Nichole Medical’s records 
also caused TriCenturion to conclude that Nichole Medical had received 
overpayments from Medicare.   Id. at p. 00007, ¶26.‡‡
 
  TriCenturion also 
concluded that Nichole Medical had not maintained sufficient medical 
records to establish the reasonableness and/or medical necessity of some of 
the medical equipment it had supplied to Medicare beneficiaries.   Id. at 
00037. 
Accordingly,  TriCenturion directed Nichole Medical’s prior carrier, 
HealthNow, to withhold payments to Nichole Medical in an effort to recoup 
the amount that TriCenturion believed had been overpaid to Nicole 
                                                 
** In its simplest form, a durable medical equipment supplier provides items such as 
hospital beds, wheel chairs, etc., to Medicare beneficiaries following the receipt of a 
medical prescription for that particular item.  See United States. v. Isiwele, 635 F.3d 196, 
198 (5th Cir. 2011).  After providing the equipment to the Medicare beneficiary, 
Medicare reimburses the supplier for the medical equipment it provided to fill the 
prescription.  See id.   
†† Nichole Medical alleged that NHIC is a “carrier” which Appellees appear to insinuate 
is an improper distinction.  See Appellees Brief, p. 4 n. 1.  However, the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 was not effective until 
October 1, 2005, and the transition from carriers to MACs occurred between October 1, 
2005, and October 1, 2011.  See  42 C.F.R. §421.400(a).  The conduct underlying 
Nichole Medical’s complaint begins as early as 2002.   
‡‡ Nichole Medical asserts that this was TriCenturion’s attempt to “bootstrap” its claims 
of inappropriate billing to a then-pending action filed by United States against Nichole 
Medical for fraudulent billing with regard to incontinence products.  Id. at 00006, ¶25.  
Nichole Medical alleges that a settlement agreement reached in that action permitted 
Nichole Medical to continue business with Medicare so long as it successfully paid the 
settlement payment. 
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Medical. Id. at 00007, ¶27.  TriCenturion determined the offset amount by 
calculating the actual overpayment of several specific claims. It then used 
those claims as a representative sampling of Nichole Medical’s claims and 
extrapolated an overpayment amount for all of Nichole Medical’s relevant 
claims from that sample.  Id. at 00019. 
 
In addition to the offset, TriCenturion also informed the Attorney 
General’s Office that Nichole Medical had improperly requested 
reimbursement for certain medical devices delivered to Medicare 
beneficiaries to fill their prescriptions.  TriCenturion persisted in its belief 
that payments had been improperly made to Nichole Medical even after the 
Attorney General found no evidence of fraud and refused to prosecute.  Id. 
at 00006, ¶23.   
 
For reasons that remain unclear, but presumably because the 
Attorney General refused to prosecute, HealthNow stopped withholding 
payments to Nichole Medical and did not attempt to recoup any further 
payments.  Id. at 00066.  However, after NHIC succeeded HealthNow, 
TriCenturion instructed NHIC to re-institute the offset.   Id.  According to 
Nichole Medical, reinstituting the offset eventually forced it out of 
business. Id.  Nevertheless, after it went out of business, Nichole Medical 
pursued an appeal of TriCenturion’s determination that it (Nichole 
Medical) had been overpaid.§§
 
   
The administrative law judge who was handling that appeal 
subsequently determined that Nichole Medical was entitled to 
reimbursement on some of the appealed claims for which payment had 
been withheld or offset, but not all such claims.***
                                                 
§§ That procedure is allowed under the Act. 
   Id. at 00035.  The ALJ 
*** TriCenturion’s post-payment audit of 39 randomly-selected claims resulted in a 
finding that benefits were improperly paid to Nichole Medical for the sale of 19 
motorized wheelchairs and the rental of 20 hospital beds.  Id.  at 00035-6.  TriCenturion 
calculated an actual overpayment amount of $98,501.47.  Id.   Additionally, using these 
39 claims against the universe of 467 claims, TriCenturion applied a statistical 
methodology to obtain an extrapolated overpayment amount totaling $485,374.54.  Id.  
When TriCenturion and NHIC reinstituted the withholding of benefits to offset this 
overpayment, Nichole Medical appealed arguing that those 39 claims were 
inappropriately re-opened and that the extrapolated overpayment amount was improper.  
Id. at 00007, ¶33.  The ALJ reviewed separately each individual claim and the sampling 
process.  Id. at 00038-56.  When reviewing each individual claim, the ALJ made a 
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also ruled that TriCenturion had failed to: (i) provide proper notice of the 
post-payment audit; (ii) establish new evidence justifying the post-payment 
audit; and (iii) fully explain the methodology used for the statistical 
sampling that resulted in the determination that Nichole Medical had been 
overpaid or improperly paid under the Act.  Id. at 00035-55.  The ALJ 
found that the extrapolated amount determined by examining the 39 claims 
that were sampled had no legal force because it was impossible to 
recalculate the sampling.  Id. at 00054-6.†††
 
 
The Medicare Appeals Council (“Council”) reviewed the ALJ’s 
decision and found that the ALJ had erred in determining which of the 39 
claims was properly paid because all 39 claims had been reopened and 
reviewed improperly.  Id. at 00018-25. 
 
After the Council entered that ruling, Nichole Medical filed this suit 
against TriCenturion and NHIC alleging that TriCenturion had wrongfully 
withheld Medicare payments owed to Nichole Medical for equipment it had 
supplied to Medicare beneficiaries and that that caused Nichole Medical’s 
insolvency.  Id. at 00007.   Nichole Medical also claimed that 
“TriCenturion conducted an unannounced, unauthorized and illegal search 
and seizure of Nichole Medical’s Medicare records” when it audited 
Nichole Medical’s cost reports and records.‡‡‡
 
  Appx., p.  00006, ¶21.   
                                                                                                                                                             
favorable ruling on 2 wheelchairs and 15 beds but the ALJ found the remaining claims 
were improperly paid to Nichole Medical, thus, resulting in overpayment.  Id. at 00035. 
 
††† The ALJ held “the extrapolated overpayment, which resulted from the statistical 
process in this case, is nullius juris, not because the statistical methodology was flawed or 
invalid but because the process, which the regulations require the government to follow, 
were [sic] not followed, thereby denying [Nichole Medical] the benefit of the law and 
regulations.  In addition, this decision declines to uphold the statistical extrapolation 
because the contractor failed to explain fully the methodology that was applied, and 
therefore this decision cannot meet its responsibility to recalculate a new extrapolated 
amount.”  Id. at 00051. 
‡‡‡ As noted by the administrative law judge, “Medicare rules do not contemplate the 
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence in the fashion of the constitutional exclusion 
of evidence in criminal proceedings.  When the evidence comes into the record by 
whatever means, it may be considered.”  Appx., p. 00038.  The administrative law judge 
did not decide the issue but acknowledged “a fair argument can be made that [Appellees] 
committed no regulatory violations when it sought additional documentation from 
whatever source possible.”  Id.  
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According to Nichole Medical’s allegations, it was forced into 
insolvency because TriCenturion “developed and implemented a business 
pattern and practice of ignoring and failing to follow statutory and 
regulatory guidelines and procedures with regard to its audit activities.”  Id. 
at 00009, ¶¶37, 40.   Nichole Medical asked the district court to award 
compensation “including, but not limited to, past and future damages of an 
economic nature, including: attorneys fees, costs, loss of sales, loss of 
revenue, loss of profits, and other expenses.”  Id. at ¶43.   Nichole Medical 
bases its claim for damages on various state law torts and breach of the 
statutory duty of care pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1320c-6(b).§§§
 
  Id. at 00065.   
The district court granted a motion to dismiss based on Nichole 
Medical’s failure to exhaust its claims before the ALJ and the Council as 
required by the Act.  Id. at 00070-77.  Alternatively, the district court 
concluded that the complaint should be dismissed because the challenged 
conduct was within the scope of TriCenturion’s and NHIC’s official duties 
under the Act and that they were therefore immune from suit under the 
Medicare Act.****
 
 Id. at 00070-77. 




A. Jurisdiction  
 
1. Judicial Review under the Act. 
 
42 U.S.C. §405(h) is incorporated into the Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§1395ii.  Section 405(h) provides 
 
[t]he findings and decision of the [Secretary] after a hearing 
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such 
hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the [Secretary] 
                                                 
§§§ The alleged torts include: negligence; unjust enrichment; intentional interference with 
contractual relations; extreme and outrageous conduct; malicious prosecution; and 
trespass (the last two claims were asserted against TriCenturion only). 
**** TriCenturion and NHIC were and continue to be represented by the United States 
Department of Justice as a result of their Medicare contracts.  See 28 U.S.C. §517 (“The 
Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the 
Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of 
the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, 
or to attend to any other interest of the United States.”). 
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shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental 
agency except as herein provided. No action against the 
United States, the [Secretary], or any officer or employee 
thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 
28
Id. (emphasis added). Section 405(h) thus limits judicial review of claims 
“arising under” the Act. See Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc. v. United 
States, 145 F.3d 1000, 1002-3 (8th Cir. 1998).  In Midland Psychiatric 
Association, Inc., the Eighth Circuit explained: “the last four words of 
§405(h)’s second sentence—‘except as herein provided’—refer to the rest 
of 42 U.S.C. §405, particularly §405(g) . . . .”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  Section 405(g)  provides that  
 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter. 
 
[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner 
[is] . . . made after a hearing to which he was a party, 
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a 
review of such decision by a civil action commenced within 
sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision . 
. . .  The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings 
and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, 
or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.  
Id. at §405(g) (emphasis added).  “Section 405(h) purports to make 
exclusive the judicial review method set forth in §405(g).”  Shalala v. 
Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 10 (2000).  We have 
previously explained that: “there is no judicial review of final agency action 
under the district court’s federal question jurisdiction [under the Act].”  
Fanning v. United States, 346 F.3d 386, 402 (3d Cir. 2003). 
  
 Nichole Medical argues that Congress only intended §405(h) to bar 
federal jurisdiction of suits under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1346 and, 
therefore, its suit against TriCenturion and NHIC was improperly dismissed 
because the court had diversity jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §1332. 
  
 When it was originally enacted, however, §405(h) barred virtually 
all grants of jurisdiction under Title 28.  Subsequent “technical corrections” 
were made in 1976, which resulted in the current wording of that section.  
We agree that the language may at first appear to bar only jurisdiction 
under §§1331 or 1346 of Title 28.  However, it is clear that the changes 
enacted in 1976 were intended only as “technical corrections” and they 
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were therefore not intended to make any substantive change in the statute. 
See Bodimetric Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 903 F.2d 
480, 488 (7th Cir. 1990).  Accordingly, we hold that §405(h) continues to 
bar virtually all grants of jurisdiction under Title 28. 
  
 In Bodimetric, the Seventh Circuit explained: “In this section, 
Congress clearly expressed its intent not to alter the substantive scope of 
section 405(h).  Because the previous version of section 405(h) precluded 
judicial review of diversity actions, so too must newly revised section 
405(h) bar these actions.  Any other interpretation would contravene 
section 2664(b) by ‘changing or affecting a right, liability, status, or 
interpretation’ of section 405(h) that existed before the Technical 
Corrections were enacted.”   903 F.2d. at 489 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).   Similarly, in Midland 
Psychiatric Association, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found 
“the jurisdictional bar imposed by sentence three of §405(h) extends to 
claims based on diversity of citizenship” because “[w]hen Congress revised 
sentence three, it labeled the amendment a technical correction, and at the 
same time made clear that no substantive change in the law was intended.”  
145 F.3d at 1004.   
  
 We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that Nichole 
Medical’s attempt to rely on the court’s diversity jurisdiction by filing 
under §1332 is barred by §405(h) if those claims “arise under” the 
Medicare Act.   Congress clearly prohibited federal courts from exercising 
subject matter jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction over claims arising 
under the Act.  
 
2. Nichole Medical’s Claims Arise “under the Act.” 
  
 We exercise plenary review over the district court’s dismissal of a 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Gould Electronics Inc. v. 
United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  In reviewing a facial 
attack to the court’s jurisdiction, “courts must only consider the allegations 
of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id.  Moreover, Nichole Medical 
carries the burden of convincing us that Congress has not barred federal 
courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this suit. 
  
 Nichole Medical’s claims for damages are supported by allegations 
that the defendants:  (i) wrongfully entered Nichole Medical’s premises to 
review its records; (ii) improperly withheld payments to offset purported 
overpayments; and (iii) unnecessarily informed the CMS of their concerns 
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with Nichole Medical’s billing practices.  Appellant’s Brief, pp. 10-16.    
Despite those allegations and their relationship to Medicare, Nichole 
Medical argues that its claims do not arise under the Act because it is not 
asking a court to determine “whether Medicare should pay the claims as 
submitted, how much should be paid, or whether the [Appellees’] conduct 
was illegal, wrongful or improper” and “at bottom [it is] not seeking to 
recover benefits” but rather it is seeking damages arising from Appellees’ 
“unlawful” conduct.††††
 In attempting to argue the contrary proposition, Nichole Medical 
relies on Ardary v. Aetna Health Plans of Southern California, Inc., 98 F.3d 
496 (9th Cir. 1996), wherein the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
found state law claims did not arise under the Act because, at bottom, they 
were not seeking to recover benefits.  See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 15-16.  
However, that case involved a wrongful death action and the court merely 
concluded that the Act did not preclude the heirs of a deceased Medicare 
beneficiary from bringing state law claims for wrongful death against a 
private Medicare provider.  See Ardary, 98 F.3d at 498.   The plaintiffs 
there were seeking compensatory and punitive damages on the grounds that 
the Medicare provider improperly denied emergency medical services and 
misrepresented its managed care plan.  Id.  
   Id.  Of course, that argument totally ignores the 
underlying reality that all of the actions complained of are squarely rooted 
in, and arise from, the relationship between the parties.  That relationship is 
firmly rooted in the Act and certainly arises from it. 
  
 Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently 
clarified the limited nature of the holding in Ardary by explaining that it 
“does not extend beyond patients and torts committed in the sale or 
provision of medical services.”  Kaiser v. Blue Cross of Cal., 347 F.3d 
1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003).  That is simply not this case. 
 
The Supreme Court has defined claims that “arise under” the Act as 
claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a claim for benefits or 
claims where “both the standing and the substantive basis for presentation” 
is the Act.  Shalala, 529 U.S. at 12.  A claim is “inextricably intertwined” if 
it does not involve issues separate from the party’s claim that it is entitled 
                                                 
†††† Nichole Medical’s allegations that the Appellees’ conduct was unlawful, alone, are 
entirely insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1949 (2009) (“The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility 
that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . . threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); see also Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578, F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The District Court must accept 
all the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.”). 
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to benefits and/or if those claims are not completely separate from its 
substantive claim to benefits.  See Cathedral Rock of North College v. 
Shalala, 223 F.3d 354, 363 (6th Cir. 2000).   
A claim can arise under the Medicare Act even if the substantive 
relief sought is not permitted by the Act. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 
602, 623 (1984).  As the Ninth Circuit explained in Kaiser, “[t]he fact that 
[Appellant] seek[s] damages beyond the reimbursement payments available 
under Medicare does not exclude the possibility that [its] case arises under 
Medicare.  Simply put, the type of remedy sought is not strongly probative 
of whether a claim falls under §405(h).”  347 F.3d at 1112. 
 
Bodimetric Health Services, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty is 
illustrative of this point and “on all fours” with Nichole Medical’s attempt 
to argue that its claims do not “arise under” the Act.  There, a Medicare 
intermediary refused to pay certain claims and, as a result, Bodimetric went 
out of business.  Bodimetric, 903 F.2d 480, 482-83 (7th Cir. 1990).  
Bodimetric sued the intermediary for fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach 
of contractual relationship, tortious breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and intentional harm to property interest.  Id.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Bodimetric’s assertion 
that its tort claims did not arise under the Act.  The court explained: a 
“party cannot avoid the Medicare Act’s jurisdictional bar simply by styling 
its attack as a claim for collateral damages instead of a challenge to the 
underlying denial of benefits.”  Id. at 487 (“If litigants who have been 
denied benefits could routinely obtain judicial review of these decisions by 
recharacterizing their claims under state and federal causes of action, the 
Medicare Act’s goal of limited judicial review for a substantial number of 
claims would be severely undermined.”).  We agree. 
 
Here, based on its own recitation of facts, it is clear that Nichole 
Medical’s action is, at bottom, nothing more than an argument that it was 
entitled to payments under the Medicare program, those payments were 
delayed or denied, and Nichole Medical suffered damages as a result.  
Thus, these claims are not only “inextricably intertwined” with Nichole 
Medical’s claim for benefits, they derive from (and are firmly rooted in) the 
Act.  See, e.g. Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc., 145 F.3d at 1005 (finding 
a tortious interference claim to be “inextricably intertwined” with a 
Medicare benefits determination because “[a]t bottom, [Appellant] is 
claiming [the Medicare carrier] should have paid for its services.”); 
Bodimetric, 903 F.2d at 486 (“[Appellant’s] grievance is, at bottom, a 
challenge to [the intermediary’s] approach to processing claims. Judicial 
review of such a challenge seems to be foreclosed.”); Fanning, 346 F.3d at 
400 (It is “apparent that both the standing and the substantive basis for the 
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claim . . . are rooted in, and derived from, the Medicare Act” when the 
claim was wholly dependent on whether the parties qualified as a primary 
plan as defined by the Act). 
 
3. Judicial Review of Nichole Medical’s Claims 
 
Nichole Medical concedes that it did not raise the tort and contract 
claims that this suit is based on during its Medicare appeals process.‡‡‡‡
 
  To 
obtain judicial review under §405(g), however, Nichole Medical “must 
have complied with (1) a nonwaivable requirement of presentation of any 
claim to the Secretary, and (2) a requirement of exhaustion of 
administrative review, which the Secretary may waive.” Cathedral Rock, 
223 F.3d at 359 (emphasis added); see also Ringer, 466 U.S. at 617 (“[T]he 
exhaustion requirement of §405(g) consists of a nonwaivable requirement 
that a ‘claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary’ and a 
waivable requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the 
Secretary be pursued fully by the claimant.”) (internal citations omitted).  
“‘[A]ll aspects of [Nichole Medical’s] claim for benefits should be 
channeled first into the administrative process which Congress provided for 
the determination of claims for benefits.’”  Fanning, 346 F.3d at 395 
(quoting Ringer, 466 U.S. at 614). 
Moreover, Nichole Medical is not exempt from this exhaustion 
requirement simply because the claims arising under the Act are not within 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary.  See Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765 (“Plainly [the 
purposes for exhaustion] have been served once the Secretary has satisfied 
himself that the only issue is the constitutionality of a statutory 
requirement, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine, and 
that the claim is neither otherwise invalid nor cognizable under a different 
section of the Act.”).§§§§
                                                 
‡‡‡‡ Nichole Medical avers that (i) it exhausted all claims that it was required to under the 
Act; and (ii) there is no administrative procedure to obtain review of state law claims for 
damages.  Appellant’s Brief, pp. 10-16.  Additionally, Nichole Medical argues that the 
“scope of the administrative proceedings was limited to a determination on claims for 
benefits, i.e., whether benefits should be paid, and if so, in what amount” and, therefore, 
it was not required to exhaust its claims.  Id. at 9-10.    
   
§§§§ See, e.g. Kaiser, 347 F.3d at 1115 (“And, while the administrative action may in 
some sense be futile for [Appellant] (if the administrative process cannot provide the 
damages the [Appellant] seek[s]), the administrative exhaustion of [Appellant’s] claims 
would still serve the purposes of exhaustion and not be futile in the context of the 
system.”); Shalala, 529 U.S. at 24 (“At a minimum, however, the matter must be 
presented to the agency prior to review in a federal court.”);  Id. at 23 (“After the action 
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To conclude otherwise would allow any party to avoid the Act’s 
administrative procedures for reviewing the Secretary’s determinations 
simply by restyling their argument as something different.  See Cathedral 
Rock, 223 F.3d at 363.  Accordingly, Nichole Medical improperly advances 
an action based on unexhausted claims that “arise under” the Act.  See 
Kaiser, 347 F.3d at 1116 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ll inextricably 
intertwined claims must first be raised in an administrative process.  In that 
process, the agency, with the benefit of its experience and expertise, can 
resolve whatever issues it can, limiting the number of issues before judicial 
review (and limiting review on those issues according to the appropriate 
standard of deference).”).   
 
Without a final agency decision on Nichole Medical’s claims, the 
district court lacks jurisdiction to review this action.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§405(h).  Because §§1331 and 1332 jurisdiction is barred and the 
prerequisites of §405(g) have not been satisfied, the district court properly 
determined that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 
Nichole Medical’s state law claims. 
 
B. Official Immunity for Medicare Contractors 
 
In the alternative, the district court also dismissed Nichole Medical’s 
action for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted because it 
found TriCenturion and NHIC were entitled to official immunity.  Our 
review of the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim is plenary.  Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 
(3d Cir. 1997).  “In considering whether a complaint should have been 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, [this 
Court] must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and accept 
all of the allegations as true.”  ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 
(3d Cir. 1994).   
 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted when it appears to a 
certainty that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be 
                                                                                                                                                             
has been [channeled through the agency], the court will consider the contention when it 
later reviews the action.  And a court reviewing an agency determination under §405(g) 
has adequate authority to resolve any statutory or constitutional content that the agency 
does not, or cannot, decide . . . .”); Kaiser, 347 F.3d at 1116 n.4 (The agency “may make 
a determination that it is without authority to decide and grant the . . . right to obtain 
judicial review. . . . Such determinations would satisfy presentment and exhaustion, and 
permit [courts] to hear claims [inextricably intertwined with claims arising under the Act] 
. . .”). 
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proved.  Morse, 132 F.3d at 906.  Though Nichole Medical’s complaint 
need not set forth detailed allegations, it must provide the grounds for its 
entitlement to relief which requires more than labels, conclusions and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.  See Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 
On appeal, TriCenturion and NHIC assert that, “as Medicare 
contractors—acting on behalf of the Secretary and performing functions 
under their contract with CMS—and because the complaint alleges only 
state-law tort claims, [Appellees] are entitled to official immunity.”  
Appellees’ Brief, p. 17.  Nichole Medical argues that “government 
contractors who engage in illegal conduct have no claim to immunity” and, 
therefore, official immunity should not be extended to Appellees.*****  
Nichole Medical’s argument is unpersuasive.  TriCenturion and 
NHIC, as Medicare contractors, are entitled to immunity for discretionary 
conduct that falls within the outer perimeter of their official duties.  
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 300 (1988); see also 42 C.F.R. §421.5(b) 
(Medicare contractors “act on behalf of the CMS in carrying out certain 
administrative responsibilities that the law imposes”); Midland Psychiatric 
Association., 145 F.3d at 1003-4 (Medicare contractors are government 
agents because they are “[u]nder contract with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, [and] do the work of the Government on the Secretary’s 
behalf.”).  
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 18-22.   
 
Under the Act, Appellees had discretion to suspend payments to 
recoup monies they believed had been overpaid to suppliers.  See 42 C.F.R. 
§405.371.  Appellees were discharging that discretionary duty when they 
withheld benefits to recoup the perceived overpayments to Nichole 
Medical.  See id.  Since Nichole Medical is seeking damages purportedly 
                                                 
***** Putting aside the fact that an agency should be permitted, in the first instance, to 
determine whether its agents acted outside of their statutory authority, the plain language 
of the implementing regulations provides Appellees with the authority to withhold 
payments to entities furnishing services or items under the Act.  See 42 C.F.R. §405.371.  
Appellees were authorized to suspend payments when they possessed reliable 
information that an overpayment had been made to Nichole Medical even if additional 
information was needed for a final determination. See id. at (a)(1).  Appellees were also 
authorized to offset or recoup Medicare payments if they determined that Nichole 
Medical had been overpaid.  See id. at (a)(3). The substance of Appellees’ findings which 
prompted the withholdings was never found to be insufficient.  In fact, though his inquiry 
was found improper on appeal, the ALJ found that 22 of the 39 claims were improperly 
paid and actually did result in overpayments made to Nichole Medical. 
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arising from the exercise of Appellees’ discretion to withhold benefits they 
are seeking damages for the exercise of discretion that is easily within the 
outer perimeter of Appellees’ official duties.  See id.   
 
Accordingly, the district court properly found that Appellees are 
entitled to immunity and dismissed Nichole Medical’s complaint.  See 
Bodimetric, 903 F.2d at 488 (“Congress apparently did not differentiate 
between the respective abilities of public and private agencies to serve as 
fiscal intermediaries, 42 U.S.C. §1395h(a), we see no reason to allow 
claimants to proceed against private agencies when they clearly cannot 
proceed against federal agencies.”).   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the district court properly 
granted Appellees motions under Fed R. Civ P. 12(b)(1) and (6) and we 
will therefore affirm its decision.  
